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CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS IN THE LIGHT
OF THE REASSERTION OF THE DOCTRINE
OF THE BOYD CASE IN THE LOS
ANGELES COMPANY CASE
By

JAMES CAREY, 3D*

This article deals chiefly with the reorganization of
corporations other than railroad, insurance, banking, municipal and building and loan associations, that is to say,
corporations, the reorganization of which is governed by
the provisions of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of
1938, known as the Chandler Act,' enacted to supersede
the provisions of Section 77B. However, the principles
here discussed would seem to be in large part applicable to
reorganizations of railroads under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended.2 As a matter of fact it will be
observed that the principles which are applicable to corporate reorganizations in general have been evolved to a
considerable extent from cases involving the reorganization of railroads through Federal equity receiverships and
foreclosure sales.
Prior to the enactment of Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, most corporate reorganizations were effected
through the medium of equity receiverships and judicial
sales. In a typical situation, title to the principal properties of the debtor would be held by a trust company as
trustee under an indenture of mortgage securing an issue
of bonds. The first step generally taken was to secure the
appointment of a Federal equity receiver in response to the
prayer in a creditor's bill, after which foreclosure proceedings would be instituted in the name of the trustee followed by a consolidation of the two causes. Such action
would be taken pursuant to a general understanding
reached between a bondholders' committee representing at
least 80% of the outstanding bonds, and protective commit* Of the Baltimore City Bar. A.B., 1916, Haverford College; LL.B., 1921,
Harvard University.
'52 Stat. at L. 883, Ch. 575.
48 Stat. at L. 912, Ch. 424 approved June 7, 1934.
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tees representing the different classes of stock of the corporation. These committees, together with the management,
which frequently held, or was identified with, a substantial
percentage of the voting stock, would reach an amicable
agreement with respect to the foreclosure, including the
form of a consent decree which would include the up-set or
minimum price at which the mortgaged properties could
be sold. It was generally possible to procure the execution of the consent foreclosure decree by the District Judge
in conventional form. The up-set price which was included in the decree was almost invariably arrived at by
negotiations between the parties, and fixed at an amount
which was calculated as carefully as possible to yield to
the dissenting bondholders a price which would be somewhat less than the estimated market value of the securities which were alloted to assenting bondholders under
the plan.'
One of the customary provisions of the decree would
allow the bondholders or their representatives, the protective committee, to credit against the foreclosure sale
price the dividend to which such bonds would become entitled after the sale, so that the amount of cash required
to be available to the protective committee was only an
amount sufficient to pay dissenters their proportionate
part of the up-set price and to cover expenses connected
with the sale. Thus real competitive bidding at such sales
was almost unheard of. At the foreclosure sale the property would be purchased either by the protective committee or by a new company organized for that purpose, generally with a name similar to that of the old company
in order to preserve, in so far as possible, good-will or
going-concern value. New money was frequently raised
from the old stockholders, to whom would be allotted a
The control of the reorganizers over the up-set price was not only
based on the fact that representatives of a majority of the bonds had
reached an agreement with representatives of a majority of the shares of
stock, but also because the bondholders' committee could be counted on to
be the only prospective bidder at the foreclosure sale, and if the up-set
price was fixed at too high an amount by the court the committee could
refuse to bid more than the amount of the price as fixed by the reorganizers.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. V

participation in the securities of the New Company upon
payment of an assessment. Since the general creditors,
sometimes characterized as the holders of the floating debt,
do not have possession of the debtor's properties and, generally speaking, are not interested in subscribing new
capital for the reorganized enterprise, those responsible
for the reorganization have not usually been under the
necessity of reaching an agreement with this class of creditors in order to expedite the reorganization or to secure
new money. Sometimes funds were allocated for the purchase of claims of general creditors at a discount and
sometimes, as in the Boyd case which we shall discuss
later, they were ignored on the theory that the bondholders
were entitled to the mortgaged property and could make
whatever arrangements they chose with respect to granting interests therein even to stockholders. Upon completion of the foreclosure sale securities of the New Company
would be issued in exchange for securities in the Old Company to those entitled under the provisions of the plan.
Generally, the same management, or at least a management which was satisfactory to the stockholders as well as
the secured creditors would continue to operate the New
Company.
With the enactment by Congress of Section 77B, in the
exercise of its power to establish uniform bankruptcy laws,
statutory reorganization procedure superseded the Federal
equity receivership method of reorganization. Plans were
originated and proposed either by the debtor or by creditors holding twenty-five per cent. of any affected class
or, if the judge had not found the debtor insolvent, by
stockholders holding ten per cent. of any affected class.
Any such plan which had been accepted by two-thirds of
each class of creditors, and by a majority of each class of
stockholders, was eligible for confirmation provided the
court found that it was "fair and equitable" and that
it did not "discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of
creditors or stockholders", and was "feasible". The acceptance by any class of creditors or stockholders which
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either was not adversely affected by the Plan or did not
have an equity in the debtor's property was not required.
Chapter X, with its revised procedure relating to corporate reorganizations, imposes the primary duty of formulating reorganization plans upon an independent trustee,
appointed by the court, and provides for advisory reports
prepared by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The securing of this report is obligatory if the debtor's
assets exceed $3,000,000; otherwise, such a report is optional. Chapter X further provides for a hearing on
the trustee's plan and on any other plans which may be
proposed by the debtor or by any creditor or stockholder,
prior to the solicitation of acceptances which can be used
in the reorganization proceedings. Before confirming the
Plan under Chapter X, the judge is required to find that it
is "fair, equitable and feasible". The language of this requirement is different from that of Section 77B dealing
with the same question, but it is submitted that there is no
difference in the legal intent and meaning of the provisions
of the two Acts.
With this background in mind, we turn to a statement
of the Los Angeles Lumber Co. case.4 This case involved
the reorganization under Section 77B of the Los Angeles
Lumber Products Company and its six subsidiaries, one of
which was the Los Angeles Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation, whose stock constituted practically the only valuable asset of the parent company. Since the parent was
liable for the debts of the subsidiaries (except current obligations not affected by the plan), assets and liabilities will
be given from a consolidated statement of the parent and
the subsidiaries. The debtor was hopelessly insolvent in
both the bankruptcy and the equity sense, and was so
found by the District Judge. The value of the assets of
the debtor as fixed by the court amounted to approximately $830,000, whereas claims of bondholders (including
ICase v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 1, 84
L. Ed. 110 (1939).
See also the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals,
In re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 100 F. (2d) 963, (C. C. A. 9th,
1939), as well as the opinion of the District Court, 24 P. Supp. 501 (D. C.
S. D. Cal., 1938).
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principal and accrued interest) amounted to approximately $3,800,000,' i. e., value of assets was less than
twenty-five per cent of the amount of the secured indebtedness. The debtor had outstanding an issue of Class A
common stock, which appears from the opinion of the
lower court to have been held by the management or
by those identified with the management. It is to
be noted that the shares of Class A stock had been
issued in 1930, in connection with a voluntary reorganization 6 in exchange for $400,000 in cash which was raised
among the then stockholders of the Company. A reorganization plan was formulated in 1937 to be made effective
either by contract or pursuant to Section 77B, and over
eighty per cent. of bondholders and stockholders of each
class accepted the same. 7 Nevertheless it was deemed
advisable to effectuate the Plan under the provisions of
Section 77B. The Plan was referred to a Special Master
by the District Judge and was modified to provide for an
authorized issue of a million shares of $1 par value voting
stock, of which 811,375 shares were non-cumulative participating preferred stock" and 188,625 shares -were common stock, allocated under the Plan as follows:
To bonds at rate 2500 shs. per
$1000 bond (77%) ..................
641,375 shs. of new pfd.
To new money ..............................
170,000 shs. of new pfd.
To Class A com. (23%) ..............
188,625 shs. of new com.
To Class B com ...........................
None
The aggregate par value of shares to be issued was $830,000
which is equal to the going concern value of the debtor's
5Total principal amount of bonds outstanding at date of 77B reorganization was $2,565,500. The bonds were issued in 1924 to mature in 1944.
6 By amendment to the trust indenture in accordance with its terms,
interest rate on the bonds was reduced from 7 % to 6% and made payable only if earned; old stock was wiped out by assessment; new stock
divided into Class A and Class B with equal voting rights--Class B stock
was allotted to bondholders to compensate for modification of indenture
and release of stockholders' liability under California law in favor of contributors, to be outstanding after Plan became effective 57,788 shares of A
stock, 5,112 shares of B stock.
7 Approximately 750,000 shares of new common was divided, roughly,
71% to bondholders, and 29% to Class A, stockholders.
sNew preferred stock was entitled to 5% dividend if earned, then
common to 5%, thereafter the two classes to share equally.
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assets as found by the Court. Acceptances were obtained
to the Plan as modified by the Special Master from over
90% of bondholders and stockholders of each class.0 Two
bondholders holding only $18,500 principal amount of
bonds objected to the Plan at the hearing before the District Court, 10 but the District Judge (Jenney, J.) confirmed
the Plan" justifying the inclusion of stockholders (1) because relative priorities were maintained and (2) because
the Court considered that certain compensatory advantages
were derived by the new company as a result of having
reached an agreement with stockholders of the old company, as follows:
(a) Continuity of present management was assured.
(b) If such an agreement had not been reached
the Company might have been liquidated, in which
event, in the opinion of the Court, the bondholders
would have received substantially less than the appraised value of the assets.
(c) Old stockholders would have had the right to
manage and control the debtor until the maturity of
Lhe bonds in 1944, if 77B proceedings had not been
instituted, since the right to foreclose upon non-payment of interest had been waived by bondholders
under the 1930 voluntary plan of reorganization. Furthermore, stockholders claimed that the institution of
proceedings under 77B and the consummation of a re'Most acceptances took the form of a failure on the part of those who
had assented to the Plan, formulated before the institution of 77B proceedings, to withdraw from the Plan upon receipt of notice of amendment.
"0Judge Jenney relied on, and quoted at length from, the opinion of
Judge Morris in Downtown Inv. Ass'n. v. Boston Metropolitan Bldg., 81 F.
(2d) 314 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936), and on In re Baldwin Locomotive Works, 21
F. Supp. 94 (D. Pa. 1937). In the former case, the District Court confirmed the Reorganization Plan dividing new common stock among first
and second mortgage bondholders as well as common stockholders, although
the Court frankly stated that no equity existed for stockholders. The
Court took the position that to hold that the words "fair and equitable" as
used in Section 77B did not permit certain adjustments between creditors
and stockholders by agreement which would not have been sanctioned by
the Court in equity receivership reorganizations would be to "nullify the
provisions of the Act which was passed to facilitate corporate reorganizations." In the latter decision the Court took the general position that in
the exercise of its power of approval it should defer to the business judgment of those whose property was at stake.
11 These bondholders had not accepted the 1930 Plan, but were bound
by its terms under the provisions of the Indenture.
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organization was the equivalent of a foreclosure within the meaning of the agreement.
(d) By effecting an expeditious reorganization,
after which the debtor's properties were unencumbered as a result of the exchange of bonds for preferred stock under the plan, the reorganized company
was placed in a position to secure corporate surety
bonds and made eligible to undertake construction
work in connection with the Government's program
which currently affected the territory in which the
debtor operated. The Court stressed the fact that
timely participation in this program might materially
increase the prospective earnings of the company and
add to its going concern value.
The Supreme Court held that the District Court erred
in confirming the Plan, and that the Circuit Court of Appeals erred in affirming the lower court's decree, on the
ground that the Plan was not fair and equitable as a matter
12
of law.
Mr. Justice Douglas states as follows the views of the
Court as to the meaning of "fair and equitable" as used in
Section 77B, views which are undoubtedly applicable to
test the fairness of a Plan under Chapter X:
"The words 'fair and equitable' as used in Section
77B (f) are words of art which prior to the advent of
Section 77B had acquired a fixed meaning through
judicial interpretations in the field of equity receivership reorganizations....
"In equity reorganization law the term 'fair and
equitable' included, inter alia, the rules of law enunciated by this Court in the familiar cases of Chicago,
R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Howard, 7 Wall. 392, 19 L. Ed. 117
[generally referred to as the Howard case 13 ] ; Louisville
12 By stipulation only questions of substantive law were raised on appeal
on an abbreviated record.
1"The Howard case involved a reorganization through Federal equity
receivership and the foreclosure of the railroad mortgages involved. In
spite of insolvency of the debtor and the existence of a substantial floating
debt stockholders participated in the securities of the New Company pursuant to an agreement between the bondholders and the stockholders.
The Monon case likewise involved a reorganization through equity receivership and foreclosure of the railroad mortgage involved. The rights
of unsecured creditors were ignored. The Court in setting aside the foreclosure decree and holding the New Company liable for the debt of the
complainant, states in substance that although it is perfectly permissible
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Trust Co. v. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co., 174 U. S. 674,
43 L. Ed. 1130, 19 S. Ct. 827 [generally referred to as
the Monon case]; Northern P. R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S.
482, 57 L. Ed. 931, 33 S. Ct. 554 [generally referred to
as the Boyd case]; Kansas City Terminal R. Co. v.
Central Union Trust Co., 271 U. S. 445, 70 L. Ed. 1028,
46 S. Ct. 549 [this case will be sometimes referred to
as the Kansas City R. Co. case]. These cases dealt
with the precedence to be accorded creditors over
stockholders in reorganization plans. In Louisville
Trust Co. v. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co., 174 U. S. 674,
43 L. Ed. 1130, 19 S. Ct. 827, supra, this Court reaffirmed the 'familiar rule' that 'the stockholder's interest in the property is subordinate to the rights of creditors; first of secured and then of unsecured creditors.'
And it went on to say that 'any arrangement of the
parties by which the subordinate rights and interests
of the stockholders are attempted to be secured at the
expense of the prior rights of either class of creditors
comes within judicial denunciation' (p. 684). This
doctrine is the 'fixed principle' according to which
Northern P. R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 57 L. Ed. 931,
33 S. Ct. 554, supra, decided that the character of reorganization plans was to be evaluated. And in the
latter case this Court added, 'If the value of the road
justified the issuance of stock in exchange for old
shares, the creditors were entitled to the benefit of
that value, whether it was present or prospective, for
dividends or only for purposes of control. In either
event, it was a right of property out of which the creditors were entitled to be paid before the stockholders
could retain it for any purpose whatever.' (p. 508.)
On the reaffirmation of this 'fixed principle' of reorganization law in Kansas City Terminal R. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co., supra, it was said that 'to the extent of their debts creditors are entitled to priority
over stockholders against all the property of an insolvent corporation' (p. 455). In application of this
rule of full or absolute priority this Court recognized
certain practical considerations and made it clear that
such rule did not 'require the impossible and make
for the bondholders of an insolvent company to give away an interest in
the New Company which belongs to the bondholders, nevertheless for bondholders to secure waivers from stockholders of objections to foreclosure
proceedings in order to expedite the same and then afterwards to transfer
to stockholders an interest in the New Company "deserves the condemnation of any court".
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it necessary to pay an unsecured creditor in cash as a
condition of stockholders retaining an interest in the
reorganized company. His interest can be preserved
by the issuance, on equitable terms, of income bonds
or preferred stock.' Northern P. R. Co. v. Boyd, supra
(228 U. S. 508, 57 L. Ed. 943, 33 S. Ct. 554). And this
practical aspect of the problem was further amplified
in Kansas City Terminal R. Co. v. Central Union Trust
Co., supra, by the statement that 'when necessary,
they (creditors) may be protected through other arrangements which distinctly recognize their equitable
right to be preferred to stockholders against the full
value of all property belonging to the debtor corporation, and afford each of them fair opportunity, measured by the existing circumstances, to avail himself
of this right' (pp. 454, 455). And it also recognized
the necessity at times of permitting the inclusion of
stockholders on payment of contributions, even though
the debtor company was insolvent. As stated in Kansas City Terminal R. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co.,
supra (271 U. S. 455, 70 L. Ed. 1032, 46 S. Ct. 549):
'Generally, additional funds will be essential to the
success of the undertaking, and it may be impossible
to obtain them unless stockholders are permitted to
contribute and retain an interest sufficiently valuable
to move them. In such or similar cases the chancellor may exercise an informed discretion concerning
the practical adjustment of the several rights.' But
even so, payment of cash by the stockholders for new
stock did not itself save the plan from the rigors of the
'fixed principles' of the Boyd Case, for in that case
the decree was struck down where provision was not
made for the unsecured creditor and even though the
stockholders paid cash for their new stock."
The decision of the Supreme Court in the Los Angeles
Lumber Company case establishes certain principles, and
directly and by implication raises a number of very interesting questions for discussion and speculation.
In the first place, it makes it clear that the so-called
fixed principle of the Boyd case, as supplemented by the
Howard, Monon and Kansas City R. Co. cases, (which will
sometimes be referred to herein as the doctrine of the
Boyd case) is to be applied to reorganizations to deter-
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mine whether or not plans are "fair and equitable" within
the meaning of the provisions of Section 77B, and it may be
stated with assurance likewise within the meaning of the
provisions of Chapter X of the Chandler Act." This refocusing of the spotlight on the Boyd case which has been
the subject of so much discussion and comment during the
last twenty-five years, makes it pertinent to review this
well known decision of the Supreme Court.
The Boyd case involved reorganization of the Northern
Pacific Railway Company through Federal equity receivership and foreclosure of the mortgage securing its bonds.
The Old Company at the time of reorganization had outstanding approximately $157,000,000 of old bonds and receivers' certificates, and large issues of preferred and common stocks. The following is a condensed skeleton outline
of the Plan in the Boyd case, as well as the capitalization
of the New Company formed to acquire the assets of the
Old Company in reorganization:
Securities of the
Old Company

Securities of the New Company
under the Plan

$190,000,000 new bonds
B on d s ..........................
$157,000,000
Preferred ....................
50% in new preferred and

Com m on ......................

50% in new common, upon payment of an assessment of $10
per share.
100% of new common upon the
payment of an assessment of
$15 a share.

Capitalizationof the New Company:
$190,000,000
B onds ......................................
75,000,000
Preferred Stock ....................
Common Stock ....... :............
80,000,000
$345,000,000
Total ..................................
1 The Supreme Court in its opinion in the Los Angeles Co. case states
(note 14) ". . . the standard of 'fair and equitable' as used in §77-B
remained unaltered as one of the criteria necessary for the confirmation
of a plan of reorganization."
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Under the Plan, no provision was made for a large floating debt, but the debtor purchased unsecured claims
totalling $14,000,000. The total cash contributed by preferred and common stockholders in response to assessments
amounted to $11,000,000. A committee representing unsecured creditors conducted an unsuccessful attack on the
foreclosure proceedings on the ground that such proceedings had been instituted pursuant to a conspiracy between
bondholders and stockholders for the purpose of excluding
the floating debt from participating in the securities of the
New Company, and of turning over a valuable equity in
the properties of the debtor to the stockholders. The District Court found:
(a) That the Railroad was insolvent, and
(b) That its assets were insufficient to meet its mortgage indebtedness, and
(c) That its net income was insufficient to meet its
fixed charges, and
(d) That there was no equity for stockholders, and
(e) That the Court was without power to impose a
plan of reorganization.
The up-set price was fixed at $61,500,000, that is to
say, $86,000,000 less than the secured debts. The properties were transferred to the New Company which issued
the $345,000,000 of securities to the security holders of the
New Company, divided as shown above. Most of the old
stockholders paid their assessments and became stockholders of the New Company. Ten years after the Plan
was consummated, Boyd, the holder of an unsecured claim
amounting to approximately $71,000 which had been reduced to judgment against the Old Company, brought suit
both against the Old Company and the New Company for
the purpose of enforcing his claim against the property
acquired by the New Company at foreclosure sale, claiming
that the foreclosure sale was invalid on the ground that
it was a step in a plan of reorganization agreed to between
bondholders and stockholders to the exclusion of general
creditors. The lower court entered a decree, the effect of
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which was to give Boyd a lien on the property of the Old
Company in the hands of the New Company, subject to
mortgages which were executed pursuant to the provisions
of the Reorganization Plan. The Supreme Court affirmed
the decree. 5
While many views have been expressed as to the
grounds for the decision and the extent of its application,
it is submitted that the soundest point of view, which is
now widely accepted, is that the doctrine of the Boyd case
is based upon the law of fraudulent conveyance. 16 Under
this doctrine if a creditor who is entitled to satisfy his
claim out of specific property surrenders the property, or
any part of it, such property becomes available for the
satisfaction of claims of other creditors. In the Boyd case
the bondholders were entitled to all of the assets. By
agreement the stockholders received an interest in the
property, although creditors received nothing. The Court
took the position that the same legal consequences attached
to the transfer of the assets to the stockholders which
would have attached if the assets had been transferred directly to the debtor. This view is well expressed by
Gerdes in his treatise on Corporate Reorganizations: 7
"The Boyd case states the principle that any plan
of reorganization which provides for the participation
of stockholders without making provision for all unsecured creditors is an unfair plan, and that this is true
whether or not any equity exists in the property of the
old company above the secured indebtedness. The
principle of the Boyd case is really one of fraudulent
conveyance. For the purpose of doing justice the veil
of the corporate entity is pierced and the stockholders
were treated as if they were the corporation. As a
result the conveyance of the property by the old corporation to a new one in which the old stockholders
are given an interest, is treated in exactly the same
manner as if the distribution to the old stockholders
was a payment to the old corporation. Viewed in this
15

Dissenting, C. J. White, and JJ. Lurton, Holmes and Van Deventer.
10 Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganizations (1933) 19 Va. L. Rev. 541, cited by Douglas, J., in Note 7 to
his opinion in the Los Angeles Co. case. Gerdes, General Principles of
Plans of Corporate Reorganization (1940) 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 39.
17 2 GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
(1936) See. 1083.
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light it appears that the mortgagor has sold the property to itself. Under such circumstances, the assets or
securities given to the old stockholders should be and
are reachable by the creditors of the old corporation.
As the new corporation was a party to the 'fraudulent
conveyance' chargeable with knowledge, the court permits the old creditors to proceed against the property
of the'new corporation to the extent of the value given
to the old stockholders on the reorganization."
If we accept this view as to the basis of the decision in
the Boyd case, it means that the doctrine is limited to cases
in which stockholders of the New Company receive an interest although unsecured creditors or creditors of any
other class are excluded. This conclusion is not consistent
with the views expressed by Robert T. Swaine, of the New
York City bar, in a lecture given before the Bar Association
of the City of New York,' when he interpreted the Boyd
case as follows:
"The rule as I see it, and as I believe it will ultimately be developed by the courts, is that the relative
priorities of the old securities, senior to the most junior
securities which continue to have any interest in the
property, must not be inequitably disturbed. Stockholders cannot be put ahead of creditors. Unsecured
creditors cannot be put ahead of bondholders. Junior
bondholders cannot be put ahead of senior bondholders; and, it is submitted common stockholders cannot
unite with bondholders in the plan which will put
them ahead of preferred stockholders."
Judge Jerome N. Frank, recent Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in an article written in
1933 strongly excepts to Mr. Swaine's views on the subject
of the Boyd case: 19
"In 1927 Mr. Swaine construed the rule of the Boyd
case thus: First mortgage bondholders cannot through
foreclosure perfect a reorganization which includes
unsecured creditors but excludes secured mortgage
bondholders-even if (a) the property of the old com1sSOME

LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, ETC.

19Frank, stpra, n. 16, 551.

(1927) 142.
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pany is worth far less than the amount due on the
old first mortgage bonds and (b) all old stockholders
are excluded.
"When that precise question came before the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 1928, in
New York Trust v. Continental & Commercial, etc.,
Bank, 26 F. (2d) 872 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928), certiorari
denied 278 U. S. 644, 73 L. Ed. 558 (1928) the Court
adopted precisely the opposite view.
"The writer believes the Court's conclusion was
sound and Mr. Swaine was not. Mr. Swaine's error
it is submitted, was due to his failure to read the Boyd
case as an adjunct to the Howard case."
So much for the fixed disagreement between Messrs.
Frank and Swaine as to the fixed principle of the Boyd
case, but even an adherent of Judge Frank's view, which
has been adopted by implication by the Supreme Court,
finds it difficult to determine this so-called fixed principle.
In a recent article ° E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., of the faculty
of the Harvard Law School, comments as follows on this
point:
... it is easy to quote phrases from the opinions
in all of the four cases cited by Mr. Justice Douglas
in which the creditors' rights to full priority over
shareholders are proclaimed. The actual results of
the cases are, however, not conclusive, the -first three
(Howard, Monon and Boyd cases) merely deciding
that a reorganization which permits shareholders to
retain an interest while eliminating unsecured creditors altogether is not saved from being a fraudulent
conveyance by the fact that it has been carried out by
means of a judicial sale, and the last (Kansas City R.
Co. case) consisting merely of certain abstract propositions stated as answers to rather vague abstract
questions asked by a circuit court of appeals. Thus,
the Supreme Court was substantially unembarrassed
by its previous holdings in determining what the
words 'fair and equitable' actually mean as applied to
a plan which has the assent of an overwhelming majority of all classes of securityholders."
20 Dodd, The Los Angeles Lumber Products Company Case and Its Implications (1940) 53 Hnrv. L. Rev. 713. 719.
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It is submitted that the decision in the Los Angeles Company case goes no further than to make it clear that the
court cannot confirm a reorganization plan of an insolvent
corporation which provides for participation by stockholders in absence of a new contribution by stockholders
which is equivalent in value to the interests received under
the reorganization plan. However, it is also submitted
that by dicta and by reason of its stated approval of the
"fixed principle" in the Boyd case, the Supreme Court has
made it possible to assert certain general propositions
which should be given careful consideration in connection
with the preparation of reorganization plans under Chapter X:
(1) No plan can properly be affirmed by the Court
which provides for a distribution to any subordinate
class of creditors or stockholders 2unless
all prior
1
classes have been fully compensated.
(2) The meaning of the words "fair and equitable"
as is used in 77B, and we submit also as used in Chapter X, establishes the same test of fairness to be applied
by the Court as had been established and applied in
the equity receivership cases which have formulated
the so-called doctrine in the Boyd case.
(3) Even although the debtor is found to be insolvent, stockholders may participate under the Reorganization Plan if they make new contributions which are
substantially equivalent in value to22the interests which
they receive in the New Company.
(4) The overwhelming approval of each class of
creditors and each class of stockholders involved in the
reorganization does not relieve the Court from the
necessity of determining whether or not the Plan is
"fair and equitable", in fact, Mr. Justice Douglas makes
it reasonably clear that these facts should not be taken
into consideration in making this determination.
21 While it is commonly believed that this conclusion would follow from
the provisions of Chapter X which requires that the Plan be "fair, equitable
and feasible", if we accept the interpretation of the doctrine in the Boyd
case reached by Gerdes and Frank and given above, this proposition has
never been submitted to the Supreme Court and would represent an extension or modification of the doctrine in the Boyd case.
22 The language of the Supreme Court on this point is as
follows: "..
where the debtor is insolvent the stockholders' participation must be based
on a contribution in money or in moneys worth, reasonably equivalent in
view of all the circumstances to the participation of the stockholders."
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(5) A fair and fully compensatory offer must be
made to each class of creditors under the plan prior to
recognition of any class of stockholders."
(6) The application of the so-called "rule of full or
absolute priority" is approved by the Court.
(7) A valuation of the debtor's assets by the Court
is required in all cases so as to determine whether or
not one or more classes of stockholders or creditors
should be eliminated under the Plan.
The holding of the Supreme Court in the Los Angeles
Company case and the conclusions reached and asserted
by Mr. Justice Douglas as stated above, pre-suppose the
ability of the District Court to arrive at a fair valuation of
the debtor's assets for the purposes of the Reorganization
Plan. In considering this vital problem, namely, the valuation of the debtor's assets for purposes of the Plan, we
find that no principles of valuation have been established
in the equity receivership reorganizations where, as we
have seen above, the up-set price was fixed in the consent foreclosure decree by an agreement between the
parties at an amount which was related to the estimated
market price of the securities of the New Company which
were to be distributed under the Plan in exchange for
securities of the Old Company. We have noted that, in
the Boyd case, the properties there involved were purchased by the New Company for $61,500,000 and immediately thereafter used as the basis for the capitalization of
the New Company in a total amount of $345,000,000, although it must be borne in mind that $11,000,000 new
capital was raised for the reorganized enterprise by assessments against the stockholders of the Old Company as a
condition to the receipt of the participation which was
allotted to them.
However, the authorities are in general agreement that
the going-concern value of the assets of the debtor should
23 The Court recognizes with approval a statement from the opinion in
the Kansas City R. Co. case to the effect that the interest of the creditor
can be taken care of "by the issuance, on equitable terms, of income bonds
or preferred stock."
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be used for purposes of reorganization.2 4 It is submitted
that the same basis of valuation would apply not only
for purposes of determining whether or not stockholders
or the holders of other junior securities are entitled to a
participation under the Plan, but also in connection with
the determination of whether or not the debtor is insolvent within the meaning of the definition of insolvency
contained in Chapter I, Section 1(19) of the Bankruptcy
Act, 5 which is applicable under Chapter X.
It is basically sound that the reorganized company
should be valued as a "going concern" rather than at the
value of its assets on liquidation, since liquidation is not
contemplated. The value of the new enterprise is clearly
dependent upon its capacity to earn. Such a valuation,
however, resolves itself into a problem of determining
anticipated profits taking into account a multiplicity of
factors. This view is accepted by Gerdes, who in a recent
article2 6 enumerates certain factors deserving of consideration. After observing that no precise formula can be arrived at, he states as follows:
... valuations based on capitalization of estimated profits should be modified by consideration of
other factors. Additional elements which may enter
into the determination of 'going concern' values are:
(1) Original cost of fixed assets, less depreciation.
(2) Replacement value of property.
(3) Rate of obsolescence of assets due to technical development of industry.
(4) Strength of financial set-up and ability to
weather financial storms.
(5) Stability and prospects of industry.
(6) Efficiency and integrity of management."
2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937) 884-889. Consolidated
Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 61 S. Ct. 675 (U. S. 1941).
25 "A person shall be deemed insolvent within the provisions of this Act

whenever the aggregate of his property exclusive of any property which he
may have conveyed, transferred, concealed, removed or permitted to be
concealed or removed with intent to default, hinder, or delay his creditors
shall not at a fair valuation be sufficient in amount to pay his debts."
2- Gerdes, supra, n. 16.
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Judge Jerome N. Frank, writing before the enactment
of either 77B or the Chandler Act, concluded that goingconcern value should be used, but he fully appreciated the
difficulties involved. His views are stated as follows:27
"Doubtless the court will frequently find it difficult
to determine with any degree of nicety whether there
is any excess value. That problem will be peculiarly
difficult in reorganizations which occur during a period
such as the present where present earning power will
often be found to be small or non-existent. Perhaps
the court should take into account the average earnings over the preceding decade; and it is suggested
that to avoid injustice to senior securityholders, a plan
might frequently provide that distribution of the excess to junior securityholders should, in cases of doubt,
take the form of stock purchase warrants or options
to purchase stock exercisable over a period of five or
ten years."
It is submitted that Judge Frank does not emphasize
sufficiently the importance of arriving at a forecast or
estimate of prospective earnings taking into account all
the new factors which are likely to affect the earning
capacity of the reorganized company, among which are the
following: (a) after a sound reorganization, the new
company should have adequate working capital, and a
sound financial set-up from the point of view of capital
retirements. In many cases the low earning capacity of
the old company and its financial difficulties can be traced,
among other factors, to insufficient working capital coupled
with maturity of fixed obligations. (b) The new company would be operated by new or revised management
personnel.
Judge Frank does recognize that such valuations are at

best an inexact science: 27a
"The word 'value' obviously has no precise meaning, as Professor Bonbright has brilliantly explained.
But the substitution even of the vague concept 'value'
for the fictitious judicial sale as a means of dealing
27 Frank,
2" Ibid.

8,upra, n. 16, 557.
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justly with the parties would mean a great advance
from the present practice. It might serve as a red flag
to the judge, by pointing out to him that he must investigate the plan in the light of divers considerations
of fairness instead of mechanizing his decision by
reference to the meaningless device of the price bid at
the unreal sale."
Professor Bonbright, in an article to which Judge Frank
refers,2" states that the effort to discover a "single central
principle underlying the action of judges, a principle of
'reasonable value' which might take its place along with
the great, unifying principle of 'normal value' which was
developed by classical economists" has been unsuccessful
up to the present time, and continuing Mr. Bonbright says:
"I strongly suspect most of us will soon abandon even the
attempt to find the Holy Grail." Attempting to state the
problem in a more realistic way, I turn again to the views
of Bonbright in connection with the valuations to determine solvency, under 77B as follows:29
"As to methods of valuation used as a test of solvency, the reported cases are yet too meager to warrant confident generalization. There is a distinct tendency, however, (a) to insist that the corporate properties shall be valued as a 'going concern' rather than
at mere liquidation value, as long as liquidation is not
contemplated, and (b) to measure value by the test
of capitalized earnings, recent and prospective, rather
than by historical costs, 'book values' of the assets, replacement costs ('physical value'), or market prices of
outstanding securities. (A few courts have apparently been impressed by 'book values'.) But there
can already be noted a marked difference in the extent
to which courts will accept or reject the optimistic
forecasts of future earnings that are almost invariably
presented by stockholder interests."
There is a marked division between the attitudes of
courts in considering the question of solvency in connection with reorganization plans. In some instances, a liberal
attitude has been adopted as to the possibility of pros28 Bonbright, Problem of Judicial Valuation (1927) 27 Col. L. R. 493.
29 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937) 885.
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pective earnings, whereas in others, prospective earnings
have been severely discounted. In the case of In Re Hop8 0 Judge Chesnut
kins Lake Drive Realty Corporation,
makes the following statement:
"I do not think it possible to read and understand
the additions to the Bankruptcy Act without the conclusion that it was the intention of Congress that the
question of solvency was at least to be very liberally
construed in the interest of the debtor. It is not overwhelmingly clear that there is any equity in the property . . . In all events, the condition of the property
is not such that it is hopeless to anticipate that some
equity may be realized so, at the present time, it will
not be determined that the debtor is insolvent."
See also dissenting opinions by Simmonds, J., in the recent
cases of Whitmore Plaza Corporationv. Smith,3' and Metropolitan Holding Co. v. Weadock.2"
In the latter case the Court states its view as follows:"
"The underlying philosophy of all the provisions of
the Bankruptcy Act, including its agricultural adjustment provisions and the railroad and corporation reorganization sections, is that a distressed debtor should
have an opportunity for rehabilitation, and that there
is no inequity or constitutional infirmity in providing
for such opportunity so long as creditors are protected
in their priorities to the full face value of their security
at the time of reorganization .
Mr. Justice Douglas, as stated before, adopts what he terms
as "full or absolute priority doctrine" of the Boyd case.
This view was advocated by Judge Jerome Frank, following his appointment as Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, before the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York in an address which he delivered
there on March 27, 1940. As indicated above, this doctrine
calls for the complete elimination of any class of creditors
or stockholders which does not have an equity in the
:0 C. C. H. Bankr., Par. 3276 (D. Md. 1934).
1113 F. (2d) 210 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940).
"113 F. (2d) 207 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940).
3 Ibid., 209.

MARYLAND

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

V

debtor's property as determined by the Court's valuation;
and no scaling down of debts or material alterations of
the security holders' contract is permissible. This theory
has been contrasted with what has been described as the
relative priority theory.3 4 The relative priority theory
does not involve the scaling down of senior securities but
rather the recognition of the full contract rights of the
holders of senior securities, with modifications responsive
to problems of reorganization such as the change, in whole
or in part, from bonds bearing a fixed rate of interest to
income bonds. However, having thus recognized the priority of the senior securities the plan may provide interests
for junior securities on a prospective workout basis. In
general, this is the theory towards which the judges are
inclined who adopt a liberal attitude as to insolvency
and give effect to an optimistic estimate of future earnings.
This is illustrated by the attitude of Judge Chesnut in the
Hopkins Lake Drive Realty case.8 5 In such situations
Judge Jerome Frank's suggestion" to the effect that options or stock purchase warrants might be granted to
stockholders where the question of solvency is difficult
of determination is worthy of serious consideration. This
was the solution of the problem adopted by the court
in the reorganization of Midwest Utilities Company. 7
"This distinction was first made in an article by Bonbright and Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders in a
Corporate Reorganization (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 127. Under the relative
priority theory, as stated in this article, interests in a reorganized company
may be given to classes of creditors who have no equity on the basis of a
strict present determination of values, provided the full relative preferences as to claims on earnings and on dissolution are preserved.
35 See also, In
re Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 13 F. Supp. 724, 729 (D. Md.,
1935).
3' Frank, supra, n. 16.
37 In In re Middle West Utilities Co., Com. Cl. H. Bankr. Ser., Par. 3671
(D. C. N. D. Ill., 1935) Judge Wilkerson refused to confirm the plan unless
stockholders received options to buy common stock. In a ruling issued on
November 6, 1935, he said:
"The stockholders, in my opinion, should be given some additional
opportunity to share in the future prosperity of the new company,
if it turns out to be prosperous. The appearances do not justify an
outright allotment of additional shares of the new company to the
stockholders. it appears equitable, however, that the stockholders
should receive, in addition to the shares allotted them, warrants or
contracts entitling them to purchase shares in the new company at
set prices."
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In conclusion, it is interesting to discuss and speculate
briefly on the possible consequences which may result from
the decision of the Los Angeles Company case.
The management, particularly if it owns or is identified
with any substantial holdings of junior securities will be
likely to pursue desperate measures to avoid a reorganization under Chapter X. An involuntary petition, to meet
with success, requires proof of an act of bankruptcy. This
means, in a vast majority of cases, only if the petitioning
creditors can prove the insolvency of the debtor. The
most likely ground for an act of bankruptcy requires not
only the proof of insolvency but also the payment made to
an existing creditor with intent to defer, which second requirement is by no means easy to meet if the debtor
guards carefully against expenditures out of the ordinary
course of business. As a second line of defense, the
debtor is capable of, and undoubtedly will avail itself in
many cases of, its right to conduct a protracted litigation
on the question of insolvency. In other words, the necessity of securing the wholehearted cooperation of the debtor,
and in most cases, of its stockholders, remains a serious
practical problem even after the Los Angeles Company
case, as it was in the case of equity receivership reorganizations in which it came to be recognized as a necessary step
in the procedure.
There is probably no valid criticism that can be made
of the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in the
Los Angeles Company case. The properties, as stated before, had been valued at less than 25% of the claims of secured creditors; and whether the Court took a pessimistic
or optimistic view of the prospective earnings of the New
Company, it is difficult to conclude that there was any
excess value for stockholders other than the nuisance
value arising from the right to obstruct and delay. True,
considerable stress was laid upon the capacity of the
management of The Los Angeles Construction Company
and its financial standing in the community, and without
a doubt, if the attitude of the Supreme Court had been
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known in advance, the debtor would never have surrendered its right to defer foreclosure until 1944 by filing
a petition under 77B. But there surely is a line beyond
which courts should not go in permitting stockholders to
trade and bargain themselves by obstructive tactics into a
substantial interest in the securities of the New Company
at the sacrifice of the contract rights of the holders of
senior securities. Under the facts in the Los Angeles case,
the decision of the Court is a sound one because the gross
deficiency in value overrides all other relatively less important considerations.
However, the decision of the Court and its implications
will tend to make it more difficult to deal with dissenting
minorities and dissenting classes of junior security holders.
If against their will they are forced to submit to reorganization proceedings under Chapter X, under circumstances
in which they are likely to be wiped out entirely as a class
by the so-called fixed doctrine of the Boyd case, or the
doctrine of full and absolute priority, such classes of security holders will be likely to resist and attack the reorganization proceedings in every way which is open to
them. The bondholders forbidden to follow the traditional method of making an agreement with stockholders
or holders of other junior securities to expedite the reorganization proceedings will be likely to seek other methods
of reaching such a compromise, and agreements are likely
to be worked out to perfect voluntary reorganization outside of court. It is suggested that one basis for a compromise agreement between bondholders and stockholders is
on the question of the going concern value of the assets of
the debtor. There is a wide margin of error which is conceded by the former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission himself in calculating such values, as,
in fact, by implication, by Mr. Justice Douglas in his opinion recently handed down in the Consolidated Rock Products Company case. 38 It is entirely possible that judges
inclined to be unsympathetic with the decision of the
38 Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, supra, n. 24.
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Supreme Court in the Los Angeles Company case, will give
recognition to agreed values arrived at on a reasonable
prospective basis between bondholders and stockholders
and thus enable the stockholders to retain an interest under
the plan without a violation of the doctrine of the Los
Angeles Company case.

